On decision making in tandem networks by Dia, Manal
On Decision Making in Tandem Networks
by
Manal Dia
Submitted to the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Masters of Engineering in Computer Science and Engineering
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF
September 2009
ARCHNES
The author hereby
@Manal A. Dia. All rights reserved.
I LIBRARIES
grants to M.I.T. permission to reproduce and to distribute
publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole and in
part in any medium now known or hereafter created.
A u th o r ........ .. .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . ... .. .. ... ... . .. . . ..... . . . . . .. .. .. ........ ..
Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Monday, August 10 th, 2009
A) / - I/)
Certified by ........................... ... J N..............
John N. Tsitsiklis
Clarence J. Lebel Professor of Electrical Engineering
Thesis Supervisor
A ccepted by ..................................
Dr. Christopher J. Terman
Chairman, Department Committee on Graduate Theses

On Decision Making in Tandem Networks
by
Manal A. Dia
Submitted to the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
on Monday, August 1 0 th, 2009, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Engineering in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Abstract
We study the convergence of Bayesian learning in a tandem social network. Each agent receives
a noisy signal about the underlying state of the world, and observes her predecessor's action
before choosing her own. We characterize the conditions under which, as the network grows
larger, agents' beliefs converge to the true state of the world. The literature has predominantly
focused on the case where the number of possible actions is equal to that of alternative states.
We examine the case where agents pick three-valued actions to learn one of two possible states
of the world. We focus on myopic strategies, and distinguish between learning in probability
and learning almost surely. We show that ternary actions are not sufficient to achieve learning
(almost sure or in probability) when the likelihood ratios of the private signals are bounded.
When the private signals can be arbitrarily informative (unbounded likelihood ratios), we show
that there is learning, in probability. Finally, we report an experimental test of how individuals
learn from the behavior of others. We explore sequential decision making in a game of three
players, where each decision maker observes her immediate predecessor's binary or ternary
action. Our experimental design uses Amazon Mechanical Turk, and is based on a setup with
continuous signals, discrete actions and a cutoff elicitation technique introduced in [QK05). We
replicate the findings of the experimental economics literature on observational learning in the
binary action case and use them as a benchmark. We find that herds are less frequent when
subjects use three actions instead of two. In addition, our results suggest that with ternary
actions, behavior in the laboratory is less consistent with the predictions of Bayesian behavior
than with binary actions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Social network models have emerged as important frameworks to study the propagation of
information, and the formation of opinions and behaviors; they arise in a variety of settings,
from bank runs and technology adoption, to mass hysteria, medical treatment choices and
political campaigns. In these networks, individuals observe each other's behavior, and obtain
private information and ideas directly from their environment, for instance through the media.
Consider a sequence of agents, each with a noisy signal about some hidden state of the
world, where each agent needs to make a decision based on her best estimate of what that
true state is: for instance, which political candidate should she vote for? What employment or
education opportunities should she pursue? What stocks should she invest in? The behavior
of such a decision maker obviously depends on her private information. Additionally, when her
behavior is observed by other agents who are faced with the same decision problem, the other
agents will in turn want to reassess their own beliefs. Rather than blind imitation or passive
updating, this framework requires a complicated interactive reasoning that is adapted to the
corresponding network setting. This in turns raises questions about what decision strategies
will lead to learning the true underlying state of the world, i.e., cause the network to converge
to the best possible use of the information available to its constituents. Our focus is on un-
derstanding whether sequential social networks lead a society to aggregate information - under
what conditions do individuals learn the true state of the world?
The case of perfect information where each decision maker observes all previous individuals'
actions has been widely studied [BHW92, Ban92]. It is more realistic though to investigate
the case where individuals have access to only a subset of their predecessors' actions. Other
work, e.g., [ADLO08] allows for constrained access to previous actions, but only looks at cases
where decisions are binary. In view of this, it is of interest to understand how beliefs propagate
in tandem networks, where each individual can observe a ternary message decision transmitted
from her predecessor. Allowing for a ternary message helps capture situations in which a decision
maker may abstain from making a decision, declaring a less costly 'I don't know' decision.
1.2 Problem Statement
The model we analyze consists of the following:
" An unknown state of the world, which is transmitted through noisy signals to each decision
maker. We distinguish between bounded and unbounded beliefs, which is a distinction
used by Cover [Cov69] and formalized by Smith and Sorensen [SSOO], and pertains to
whether the likelihood ratio implied by these private signals is finite and bounded away
from 0 and from infinity. Unbounded beliefs refer to the case where the signals, can
be arbitrarily informative, by having arbitrarily large or small likelihood ratios, whereas
bounded beliefs refer to the case where the amount of information in any one signal is
capped and cannot provide arbitrarily strong evidence on the state of the world.
" A cost function that is conditional on the underlying unknown state, and is identical for
all agents.
" Sequential myopic decisions based on private signals and observation of ternary messages
transmitted from a predecessor.
Our problem consists of studying conditions under which learning occurs in the above model,
and contrasting them with already established findings for tandem networks communicating
with binary messages. We argue that allowing for the number of actions to be higher than
that of possible states is a powerful and useful extension; it not only provides a more realistic
representation of information propagation conditions, but also introduces a richer approach to
information herding and cascades.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
We establish learning conditions for tandem networks communicating with three-valued mes-
sages: we show that learning (in probability or almost surely) does not occur under bounded
private beliefs, while learning in probability occurs under unbounded private beliefs. We explore
an experimental test of social learning where each individual receives a private but noisy signal
regarding the underlying state of nature in an exogenously determined order. After receiving
their signal each subject communicates his or her belief about the state of the world in a sequen-
tial manner. Our experimental results suggest that herd behavior is less frequent with ternary
actions than with binary actions. A heuristic where agents follow their own signal seems to be
a better predictor of behavior than Bayesian learning theory - more so in the ternary case than
in the binary case.
1.4 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the relevant literature, organized around two central themes:
hypothesis testing and observational learning. We lay out our learning model in detail in Chapter
3, as well as definitions of learning and relevant network properties in Chapter 4. Chapter 5
presents our main theoretical findings, for both the bounded and unbounded likelihood ratio
cases. We describe our experimental test in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, we give our conclusions
and discuss future work.
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Chapter 2
Background and Prior Work
The literature on this subject draws from and applies to various areas of research. We focus on
two main themes: decentralized hypothesis testing and social and observational learning.
2.1 Decentralized Hypothesis Testing
In the field of Engineering, there is a vast literature that studies decentralized hypothesis testing,
motivated by distributed detection with decentralized sensors. The standard framework builds
on the classic two-hypothesis testing problem HO : P = Po vs. Hi : P = P1. Instead of
communicating with unconstrained sufficient statistics however, the model requires that data
be reduced after each observation X,, to a finite statistic T, E {1, 2 ... , m}, where T, is updated
according to a time-varying algorithm of the form Tn+1 = fn(T, Xn+ 1). Cover [Cov69] proves
the existence of a four-valued statistic (two-valued when beliefs are unbounded) that achieves
a zero-limiting probability of error under either hypothesis. Koplowitz [Kop75] improves on
Cover's algorithm with a scheme that requires a three-valued statistic only; he proves that given
a sequence of iid Bernoulli observations, m + 1 states are necessary and sufficient to resolve the
m-hypothesis test with a zero-limiting probability of error; for the network to learn, the number
of messages therefore needs to be one higher than the number of alternative hypotheses.
Cover and Hellman [HC70] focus on time-invariant algorithms of the form Tn+1 = f(Tn, Xn+1 ).
They characterize the asymptotic probability of error and show that it is always strictly positive
regardless of m ("No hope exists in the time invariant problem."). Cover and Hellman model
the two-hypotheses problem using a finite Markov chain, with two states corresponding to the
two distinct hypotheses, and time-invariant transition probabilities. They show that in general,
no optimal rules f exist; however, they prove the existence of an e-optimal class of rules that
are determined by the likelihood ratio dPo/dP1 and require randomization. They conclude on
a compelling note; "It would be of interest to see whether human beings, in problems to which
they have allotted finite memory (such as "like," "indifference," and "dislike") demonstrate an
optimal randomized learning procedure similar to that suggested by this paper."
Papastavrou and Athans [PA92] consolidate the previous literature by examining an infinite
tandem architecture communicating with M-valued messages to perform M-ary hypothesis
testing. They distinguish between "optimal" networks, where the objective is to minimize the
probability of error for the last decision maker in the tandem, and "suboptimal" networks, where
each decision maker tries selfishly to maximize the performance of her own decision. They show
that in the former case, the necessary and sufficient condition for the probability of error to
asymptotically go to zero is that the log-likelihood ratio of the observation of each decision
maker be unbounded , either from above or below. For suboptimal networks, they show that
the necessary and sufficient condition is that the log-likelihood ratio be unbounded from both
above and below. Papastavrou and Athans point out that "since under the suboptimal decision
scheme each decision maker tries to minimize his personal probability of error, it does not make
sense to assign to each decision maker a number of messages different from the number of the
alternative hypotheses." We argue that allowing for a number of messages that is different from
that of alternative hypotheses is an adequate representation for certain models of learning where
it might be more beneficial for an agent to declare a cheaper "I don't know" message, than to
make an uncertain costly guess of what hypothesis is true.
Tay, Tsitsiklis and Win [TTW08] show that the rate of error probability decay in Bayesian
decentralized binary hypothesis testing is sub-exponential. They also motivate the study of
tandem networks as a tool for the study of more complicated network topologies, such as trees,
or as an adequate representation of a single agent receiving private signals at multiple time
periods, while remembering her latest decision.
2.2 Social and Observational Learning
In Economics, there is a similarly extensive literature on herd behavior, information cascades
and social or observational learning. A large majority of work in this area has considered
belief propagation when all previous actions are observed. Banerjee [Ban92] and Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer and Welch [BHW92] show that when each decision maker observes all previous
actions and has bounded beliefs, there will not be asymptotic learning. Conversely, Smith
and Sorenson [SS00] prove that when private beliefs are unbounded, again under the perfect
information setup where agents observe all previous actions, there will be asymptotic learning.
Acemoglu et al. [ADLO08] consider a model where rational agents make a once in a life-
time binary decision based on a private signal, and observations of previous actions taken by
a stochastically generated neighborhood of agents. Their main theorem states that if agents
have unbounded beliefs, and in the case of expanding observations, i.e., in the absence of agents
who are excessively influential, the network is guaranteed convergence to the correct decision. 1
Conversely, they show that the existence of an excessively influential group hinders social learn-
ing. In addition, the paper generalizes findings discussed above, proving that bounded beliefs
usually imply no asymptotic learning, except in some special stochastic network topologies in
which the flow of new information supersedes private signals, causing the pertinent information
to aggregate, and the network to learn.
2.3 Herding and Information Cascades: An Experimen-
tal Approach
Empirical approaches to test for cascade behavior are mostly focused on laboratory experiments
using human subjects. Anderson and Holt [AH97] were the first to develop an experiment based
on Bikhchandani's model. In their setup, at the beginning of each round, subjects are randomly
ordered, and one of two possible states of the world is randomly selected with equal probability.
The states are represented by two urns, labeled A and B. Urn A contains 1/3 white balls and
2/3 black balls. Balls in urn B are 2/3 white and 1/3 black. The initial draw is not revealed
until the end of the round, so that agents do not know whether balls are chosen from A or B.
Each agent, however, receives a private signal about the true state of the world in the form
of one sample (with replacement) from the urn. Agents then have to make sequential public
binary decisions. At the end of the game, each agent who has guessed the true state of the
world gets a fixed reward, while agents who guessed the wrong state get nothing. Anderson and
Holt find that information cascades develop frequently in the lab.
1Note that a tandem network has expanding observations.
Kubler and Weizsicker [KW05] build on [AH97] by examining the robustness of information
cascades in laboratory experiments when private signals are no longer free: they look at the
case where decision makers decided whether or not to receive a private signal at a small but
positive cost. Though the equilibrium of their game dictates that only the first agent buys a
signal and the remaining agents herd on the decision of the first, the laboratory results show
that too many signals are bought compared to what the equilibrium predicts. They attribute
this discrepancy to high levels of noise of the subjects' inferences.
Qelen and Kariv [QK04a] set out to experimentally distinguish information cascades from
herd behavior.' Informational cascades occur when, after some finite time, all decision makers
completely ignore their private signal when choosing an action, while herd behavior occurs when,
after some finite time, all decision makers choose the same action, not necessarily ignoring their
private information.' Qelen and Kariv introduce a technique called "cutoff elicitation", which
consists of asking subjects about their strategy before seeing their private information; instead
of choosing an action directly, each agent needs to provide a cutoff such that, if the signal is
higher than the cutoff, action A is chosen, and if the signal is lower than the cutoff, action
B is chosen. They observe that in the lab, both herd behavior and cascades occur frequently,
and attribute the frequency of cascades to a noisy deviation from Bayes rationality. The same
authors [QK04b] analyze observational learning under perfect and imperfect information. In the
former, each decision maker is able to observe actions of all preceding agents, while, in the later,
each agent only observes his immediate predecessor's action. They show that under imperfect
information, there is no convergence of actions, though over time private information is ignored
and increasingly longer periods of uniform behaviors, or imitation patterns, emerge. They thus
establish that the imperfect information state introduces occasional, sharp and increasingly rare
shifts of actions that punctuate periods of long uniform herd behavior.
2.4 Summary of Previous Work for Tandem Networks
This section summarizes previous work and motivates the work of this thesis. We categorize
the findings established in the literature for tandem networks using 3 variables:
2[BHW92] introduced the terminology of a cascade to describe an infinite train of individuals acting irrespec-
tive of the content of their signals.[SSOO] were the first to decouple the notions of cascades and herds.
3An informational cascade implies herd behavior but herd behavior is not necessarily the result of an infor-
mational cascade.
1. The number D of distinct messages that each decision maker can send: Binary vs. Ternary.
Whereas the literature has mostly focused on binary messages (D = 2), this thesis looks
at the case where agents can pick between three communication messages (D = 3).
2. The decision objective: Designed vs. Myopic. The Engineering literature looks at the
problem of designing the decision rules of each agent in the network so as to minimize the
error probability of the last agent. A typical example is to specify the decision rules of a
team of sensors connected in a line, where only the decision of the last agent is taken into
account. In contrast, the Economics literature looks at the problem of minimizing the
probability of error at each decision maker, claiming that the latter is a better approxi-
mation to real-world social networks. In this myopic case, each agent picks her strategy
so as to maximize her own expected payoff, given the strategies of all other agents. 4
3. The likelihood ratio implied by the the private signal structure: Bounded vs. Unbounded.
When the likelihood ratio is bounded away from zero and infinity, there is a maximum
amount of information in any individual signal: the private beliefs are said to be bounded.
Alternatively, when the likelihood ratio can be arbitrarily high or low, private beliefs are
said to be unbounded.5
As mentioned in Sections 2.1-2.3 above, previous work has mostly focused on models
where both the number of distinct messages between agents and the underlying state of the
world are binary. Cover established that no learning occurs in the Binary x Designed x Bounded
case. It follows trivially that no learning occurs in the Binary x Myopic x Bounded case (see
first column in Table 2.1). Papastavrou and Athans showed that there is learning in the
Binary x Myopic x Unbounded case. It follows that there is learning in both the Binary x Designed
x Unbounded and the Ternary x Designed x UnBounded cases. Finally, Koplowitz established
that there is learning in the Ternary x Designed x Bounded case.
This thesis fills the gaps in the literature by proving results for myopic networks communicat-
ing with ternary messages. We establish that learning occurs in the the Ternaryx Myopicx Un-
bounded case, but not in Ternary x Myopic x Bounded case (see first row in Table 2.2). Ternary
messages capture ample situations in social and economic networks where agents have a third
option to declare a "no trade" or "don't know" message that is less costly than a wrong guess.
4See Section 3.2 for a precise definition.
5 See Section 4.2 for a precise definition.
Bounded Unbounded
Myopic N Y [PA92]
Designed N [Cov69] Y
Table 2.1: Binary Messages: Y and N refer to learning, and no learning in probability, respec-
tively. In the binary messages case, the network only converges to the true state when beliefs
are unbounded.
Bounded Unbounded
Myopic N [Our Results] Y [Our Results}
Designed Y [Kop75] Y
Table 2.2: Ternary Messages: no learning in the myopic case with bounded beliefs, and learning
with unbounded beliefs.
In addition, this thesis addresses another shortcoming of the literature corresponding to
the definition of learning. The literature defines learning as convergence in probability. The
only instance where learning is established in the almost sure sense is found in [Cov69] for the
Binary x Designed x Unbounded, where almost sure convergence is used to establish convergence
in probability. In this work, we draw a clear distinction between learning in probability and
learning almost surely, and investigate these as two separate types of learning.
Chapter 3
The Model
3.1 The Network: Agents and Interaction
The underlying state of the world, H, is unknown, and assumed to be binary, i.e., H = HO or H 1,
with prior probabilities P(Ho) and P(H 1 ), respectively. We will assume P(Ho) = P(H 1 ) = 1/2.
The network consists of a countably infinite number n of decision makers, who each make their
decisions sequentially as illustrated in Figure 3-1, and in the following manner:
Each agent t forms her belief about the state of the world based on:
1. a private signal Xt about the realization of the state of the world, independently generated
according to a probability measure determined by H, i.e., PHO or PH1 ;
2. for t > 1, the message received from her predecessor Mt_ 1 , which is ternary, and can take
one of three values {0, 1, *}.
x, X2 x x xn
dm, dm2 dm, dmft -+1 --. dm,
M, M2 Mt- Mt M, Mn- M,
Figure 3-1: Tandem Configuration: A number n of decision makers are configured in a tandem
network. Each decision maker t receives an independent message Xt and observes her predecessor's
message Mt-1 before transmitting her own message Mt to her successor.
3.2 The Decision Problem
Let us use the convention MO = 0. Given her information set It = {Xt, Mti-1}, each agent t's
strategy is a mapping from the space of private signals and predecessor messages back into the
set of messages, according to some decision rule y : Mt = 7yt(Xt, Mt_1). Her decision problem
consists of minimizing her local cost function J, where J is identical for all agents and is
described as follows,
Jt = {, 1, *} x {Ho, H1} -+R, Vt E {1, -1 ,n}.
Throughout this paper, we will assume the following cost structure for all agents t,
c, if M:H*
Jt (Mt, H) = 0, if Mt =H;
1, otherwise.
where c E (0, .5) is a given constant. Under this cost function, a 0 or 1 message can be thought
of as a best guess of the state H, whereas a * corresponds to a "don't know".
Definition 1. Given all possible decision rules I' available to an agent t and her cost function
Jt, we say that agent t acts myopically when
7, = arg min E[Jt(y(Xt, Mt_ 1), H)].
A network therefore operates myopically if each agent tries to minimize the probability of error
of her own decision: that is, each agent tries to optimize the performance of her own decision
as opposed to the global team decision, ignoring all of her successors in the team.
Chapter 4
Learning: Definition and
Characterization
In this chapter, we introduce three important concepts in the study of information aggregation in
networks. First, we distinguish between two definitions of learning. Second, we carefully define
the likelihood ratio characteristics of private signals. Finally, we specify a class of strategies
that turns out to be optimal for the decision problem we have presented.
4.1 Almost Sure Learning vs. Learning in Probability
We distinguish between two different definitions of learning: in probability and almost surely. A
network learns in probability if the probability of error asymptotically goes to zero. A stronger
definition of learning, almost surely, requires convergence with probability 1.
Definition 2. The network learns almost surely (A.S.) if limto Mt = M* almost surely, where
M j under Hj, for j 0, 1.
Definition 3. The network learns in pro bability (I.P.) if and only if limt,- P(Mt =H H) = 1,
for j = 0, 1.
4.2 Bounded vs. Unbounded Private Signals
The likelihood ratio of the densities that generate private signals plays a key role in the study of
social learning. Whereas previous work distinguishes between bounded and unbounded likeli-
hood ratios, it generally glosses over the distinction between one-sided and two-sided unbound-
edness.1
Definition 4. Let X 1 , X 2 , - be a sequence of independent identically distributed random
variables generated according to a probability measure P. We consider the two hypothesis
testing problem HO : P = Po vs. Hi : P = P1, and define the likelihood ratio L(Xt) as the
Radon-Nikodym derivative dP 1 /dPo, where Po and P1 are assumed to be absolutely continuous
with respect to each other.
(a) The signal structure (Po, P1) has bounded beliefs if there exist some #1 and #2 such that
0 < 01 < L(Xt) </32 < 00,
with probability one (wpl), under each hypothesis.
(b) The signal structure (Po, P1) is:
(i) unbounded from the left if there is no 31 > 0 such that #1 < L(Xt) with probability
one (wpl). This is the definition of unboundedness used in [Cov69).
(ii) unbounded from the right if there is no 02 such that L(Xt) < /2 wpl.
(ii) unbounded if it is both unbounded from the left and the right. This is the definition
of unboundedness used in [ADLOO8, SS00).
In the bounded beliefs case, an agent can only derive a bounded amount of evidence about
the underlying state of the world. In the unbounded beliefs case, she can receive an arbitrarily
strong signal about the underlying state of the world.
4.3 Threshold Strategies
Threshold Strategies are crucial to defining optimal decisions rules for the agents.
Definition 5. Let L(Xt) be the likelihood ratio associated with the observation Xt made by
decision maker t. A strategy for an agent t is a threshold strategy if it can be expressed as
follows:
'In one exception, Papastravou and Athans [PA92] show that one sided unboundedness is necessary and
sufficient for learning with unbounded binary messages in the myopic network, and two-sided is necessary and
sufficient in the designed case.
(i) for the first agent in the tandem t = 1, there exists a pair of thresholds (a, 13), such that,
01 if L(X 1 ) <a
if L(Xi) E [a, #)
if L(X 1 ) > #).
(ii) for each agent t > 2, there exist 3 pairs of thresholds (aMt- I Mt-1), Mt_1 = 0, *, 1, such
that, I0,
1,
if L(Xt) < aMti-1
if L(Xt) E [aLMt OMt1);
if L(Xt) 2 13M-1)
The next lemma has been widely established in the decentralized hypothesis literature, and
follows easily from the existence results in [Tsi93b] and Section 4 in [Tsi93a].
Lemma 1. There exists an optimal strategy for a myopic agent t that is a threshold strategy.
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Chapter 5
Learning With Three-valued Messages
Our main theoretical results are presented in this chapter. They are organized in two sections,
covering the bounded and unbounded likelihood ratio cases, respectively. To simplify notation,
we assume both values of the state of the world are equally likely, as mentioned in Chapter 4.
An easy modification would extend our results to the case of unequal priors.
5.1 Learning: The Bounded Likelihood Ratio Case
This section establishes no learning in the bounded beliefs case. This result is to be contrasted
with the results from designed systems, where three-valued messages are enough to guarantee
almost sure learning [Kop75).
5.1.1 Almost Sure Learning
Theorem 1. In the bounded likelihood ratio case, a tandem network operating myopically with
three-valued messages does not learn almost surely.
Proof. We shall prove this theorem by contradiction. Suppose that the myopic sequence of
messages converges a.s. Consider the corresponding finite state Markov chains (Afo) and (AHi),
under hypotheses Ho and H1 , respectively. Each Markov chain consists of 3 states, corresponding
to every possible value of message Mt at stage t. The transition probabilities are P(Mt =
kIMt_1 = 1) = pt1 for 1, k E {O, *, 1} under Ho, and P(Mt = kIMtI = 1) = qi. under H1 (Figure
5-1). Note that we have used the shorthand pI, = pkl(yt) and q., = gl(Yt) since these transition
probabilities are a function of the decision rule ytt of agent t. From our assumption, (AfO)
converges a.s. to state "0", whereas (A H) converges a.s. to state "1". It follows that Mt -+ 0
wpl under Ho. If the probability of ever getting to states "1" or "'*" is zero, then for all t > 0,
pti - 0, p, = 0, and Mt = 0.
Otherwise, it follows from the Borel-Cantelli Lemma that
5P01 < 00
t=O
p*, < o0
t=O
00o 0(pio +A,) =0
t=O
(5.1)
Figure 5-1: Markov Chains (AHo)and (AHi). Each Markov chain consists of 3 states, corresponding
to every possible value of message Mt at stage t.
Since the likelihood ratios are bounded,1 (5.1) implies that
00S (q'o + q.) = o
t=o
Then, the Borel-Cantelli lemma implies that the second Markov chain (AH,) does not converge
to state "1" with probability 1.
1This means that there exist positive quantities #1 and #2 such that 0 < 01 < goi/pti < #2 < oc and
0<#1 < go,/po, < #2 < 00.
5.1.2 Learning in Probability
We now strengthen our previous result by studying the convergence in probability of the tandem
network.
Theorem 2. In the bounded likelihood ratio case, a tandem network operating myopically with
three-valued messages does not learn in probability.
Proof. From the total probability theorem, the probability of error eT for some agent T > 1 is
given by
eT = P(MT =*) + P(MT = 1, Ho) + P(MT= 0, H1)
= P(MT *) + I[P(MT= 1|Ho) + P(MT= 0|H 1)].
Given some error bound e > 0, one of two cases are possible:
Case 1 For all T, there exists some t > T such that et > e; i.e, some subsequent decision
maker has a probability of error greater than e, so the network, by definition, does not
learn in probability.
Case 2 There exists some T such that for all t > T, the
fix such a T. At that particular time, we have
error probability et < e. Let us
P(MT = 1|Ho) < 2e
P(MT = *H1) < 2e
P(MT = OH1) < 2e.
Using Bayes' Rule and the assumption that states Ho,
implies
and H1 are equally likely, this
P(Ho MP= 1) =IH)
P(MT= i|Ho) + P(MT= i|H 1 )
+ P(MT = IH 1) 1
P(Mr = 1|Ho)]
11
< [1 + ] 1-2e
< 26.
For all private signals x observed by agent T + 1, another Bayes' Rule application yields
P(HolMT = 1, XT+1 = x) P(MT = 1,XT+l = xHo)
P(MT = 1,XT+1 = |Ho) + P(MT = 1,XT+1 = z|Hi)
P(MT = I|Ho)(
P(MT= i|Ho) + P(MT= i|H1)L(x)
where L(x) = dP1/dPo(x) is the likelihood ratio from Definition 4, and we have used
the fact that conditional on state HO, the private signals and the observed decisions are
independent, i.e., P(MT = 1, XT+1 = x|Ho) - P(MT = 1lHo)P(XT+l = xfHo). We can
then show that
P(MT = I H1 )
P(MT = i|H1)L(x)
> 1-4e
> #1(1 - 4,E). (5.3)
where the first line follows from P(MT= 1|H 1 ) + P(MT = O|H 1) + P(MT= *IHi) = 1,
and the second line uses the fact that the likelihood ratio L(x) is bounded, i.e., that there
exists #1 > 0 such that L(x) > #1, > 0 wpl for all x.
It then follows from equations (5.2) and (5.3) that
4c
P(Ho lMr 1, XT+1 = x) < 13( E A h(e).
For 6 small enough, P(HoIMT 1, XT+1 = x) is small enough,2 and agent T + 1 will
always choose MT+1 = 1, i.e., copy her predecessor, so
P(MT+1=l1IMT - 1, XT+1 = x,Ho) = 1.
By integrating or summing over the range of the private signal XT+1, it follows that
P(Ho, MT+1 = 1) > P(Ho, MT = 1).
A parallel argument can show that P(Hi, MT+1 = 0) > P(H 1 , MT= 0). By adding both
2 A series expansion of h(c) around e = 0 gives h() = 1/#1 (2E + 4E2 + 8E3 + 16E'+ 3265 + 0(66)).
2)
probabilities, we have
eT+1 ;> P(Hi, MT+1 = 0) + P(Ho, MT+1 = 1)
> P(Hi, MT= 0) + P(Ho, MT = 1)
> 0.
Therefore we have a lower bound on the probability of error which is positive and mono-
tonically nondecreasing for all t > T. Thus, et does not converge to zero, and the network
does not learn in probability.
5.2 Learning: The Unbounded Likelihood Ratio Case
As we discussed in the Literature Review, learning occurs in the unbounded belief case for two-
valued messages. Intuitively, this result should generalize to the case of three-valued messages
where we expect the tandem network to do at least as well as with two-valued messages. Proving
this result, however, requires a careful analysis.
5.2.1 Learning in Probability
Lemma 2. The expected cost (t = E[J(-yt(Xt, Mt_1 ), H)] is monotonically non-increasing: i.e.,
for all t, (t+1 < (t.
Proof. Myopic agent t + 1 picks her optimal strategy from all available strategies F as given in
Definition 1, i.e.,
7t+1 = arg min E[J(y(Xt+1, Mt), H)].
-YEF
Since F contains the copying strategy, 7t+ 1 , it follows that agent t + 1 never expects to do
worse than agent t. Because agent t+ 1 always has the option to copy agent t's decision, thereby
ensuring that her expected cost is as big as her predecessor's ((t+1 = (t), she will only deviate
when she expects to do better ((t+1 < (t). More formally,
(0+1 = min E[J(- (Xt+1, Mt), H)]yEr
< E[J(it+1 (Xt+1 , M), H)]
=E[J(7yt(Xt, Mt-1), H)]
Therefore, (t+1 < (t. The question remains whether {(t} converges or not to some limit, and
if so, whether it converges to zero or to a strictly positive number.
Theorem 3. In the unbounded likelihood ratio case, a tandem network operating myopically
with three-valued messages learns in probability.
Proof. Consider a sequence of t agents, where the first t -1 agents have each made their decision
according to the optimal myopic rule given in Definition 1. Now suppose that agent t, instead
of acting myopically like her t - 1 predecessors, decides to apply the following strategy it: she
will copy her neighbor's decision Mt_1, unless she receives an extremely high private signal, in
which case she will switch to 1. More formally, for some p big enough,3
= (X, M 1) = Mt_1, if L(Xt) < p;
11, if L(Xt) > p.
Suppose there is no learning, i.e., there exists a strictly positive quantity 6, such that for all
t > 0, the expected cost (t is bounded above 6.
We shall proceed with a proof by contradiction, first by proving that there is strict im-
provement (I), and second by showing that this strict improvement is by a positive factor of 6
(II).
For i = 0,1, define the conditional probability of passing for agent t - 1 as qi = P( _1 =
*IHj). Also define the conditional probability of an incorrect guess for agent t - 1 under Ho
and H1 as po = P(Mt i_ 1Ho) and pi = P(Mt-1 = OH1), respectively. Finally, define the
conditional probability of getting an extremely high private signal as ri = P(L(Xt) > pjHi).
3We will define what "big enough" means at the end of the proof.
Lemma 3. We have r1 > pro.
Proof. For simplicity, we consider the case where private signals are discrete. The same reason-
ing applies to the continuous time case, replacing probability mass functions with probability
densities and summation with integration.
Consider a realization of a private signal Xt = x such that L(x) = P(Xt = x|H1)/P(Xt
xIHo) > p. Note that P(Xt = xIHi) > pP(X = xIHo) is true for all x such that L(x) > p.
Therefore,
r1 = ( P(Xt = xjHi) > p ( P(Xt = x|Ho) = pro.
x:L(x);>p x:L(x)>p
I. Strict Improvement. Because we use equal priors P(Ho) = P(H1 ) = 1/2, the expected
cost of agent t - 1, assumed be bounded below by 6, is given by
(t-1 [po + cqo + p1 + cq1 ] > 6
Consequently, either po + cqo 6 or pi + cq1 > 6. Without loss of generality, assume
pi + cq1 > 6. (We can argue for the case of po + cqo 2 6 by symmetry.)
We need to argue that correct switching (i.e. switching to 1 under H1 ) is much more likely
than incorrect switching (i.e. switching to 1 under HO), or equivalently that r1 > ro. The
expected cost of agent t, had she acted myopically, is less than her expected cost with her
suboptimal strategy i7t. Therefore,
(= min E[J(y(Xt, Mt), H)]
'YEF
E [J ( t (Xt, Mt), H)]
S [(1 - po - qo)ro + cqo(1 - ro) + qoro + pi(1 - ri) + cqi(1- r)]
1
< I po + cqo + pi + cqi + ro - (p1 + cqi)ri]
(t-i + I [ro - (p1 + cqi)ri]
1
< (0-i + - ro - or1] ,
where we have used Figure 5-2 to calculate E[J(it(Xt, Mt), H)].
M ~ - M =0U 0
1-po- qO 
ro t
q M =*M1*
M= 1 M M=1
P(H) H, t-
r t
q 0 ro M t=1
H JM=1
P(HI)M =1 t
Figure 5-2: Universe of possibilities for agent t who applies a suboptimal strategy it. Each
branch is associated with a conditional probability (in italics). Messages in bold correspond
to the correct decisions. The dashed branch correspond to an incorrect switching, while the
bolded branches correspond to a correct switching. We argue that correct switching is much
more likely than incorrect switching.
To prove strict improvement, we need to argue that ro - Sri is negative. Using Lemma 3,
we get
1 ri
II. By a positive factor of S. To complete our proof, we would like to establish a good
bound for the strict improvement described in I. For this, we pick a threshold p that is big
enough, i.e., ri/p Sri or p 2 1/S. For example, we pick p =2/5. In this case,
1
(t (t-1 
- gori.
Since this inequality would have to be true for every t, and since ( > 0, we obtain a contradic-
tion, thus completing our proof. po
We now extend Theorem 3 to the case where agents can communicate with D-valued mes-
sages D > 2 When D > 3 we consider the following cost structure
0, ifH=HoandMt=Oor H=HiandMt=D-1;
Jt (Mt,H)=<ci, ifH = Hoand Mt =1,---D-2;
di, ifH=HandMt=1, ,D-2;
1, otherwise,
where ci and di are in (0, 0.5).
Theorem 4. In the unbounded likelihood ratio case, a tandem network operating myopically
with D-valued messages, D > 2 learns in probability.
Proof. A proof for the case D = 2 can be found in [PA92, Proposition 3]. Theorem 3 proved
the case D = 3. The proof for D > 4 proceeds as for Theorem 3, by coalescing messages 1
through D - 2 into one "don't know" or * message. 0
5.2.2 Almost Sure Learning
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the decentralized detection literature finds that tandem networks
can learn almost surely with two messages and unbounded private beliefs (e.g., [Cov69, Theorem
1]). The standard herding models however are limited to learning in probability (e.g., [BHW92,
SS00, ADLO08]. In this section we discuss learning almost surely when the private beliefs
are unbounded. We conjecture that almost sure learning can be achieved with three-valued
messages, with certain private signal structures.
Rates of Convergence for Decentralized Hypothesis Testing with Binary Messages
Tay, Tsitsiklis and Win [TTW08] study the decay rate of the probability of error over a tandem
network with two-valued messages. They consider a Gaussian hypothesis testing problem;
private signals are distributed according to a zero-mean normal distribution with variance o-
under Ha and of under H1 (0 < o 1 <of).' They prove that a selfish strategy5 where an
4Note that this is a one-sided unbounded private signal structure (unbounded from the left).
5Formally, the strategy yt is defined for t > 1 as,
YOlt (MI1, Xt) (0, if Xt < logt and Mt 1 = 0;1, otherwise.
where MO = 0.
agent t decides Mt = 1 if and only if X2 > log t for some i < t achieves a probability of error
O(t 7). Building on this example, a particular Gaussian hypothesis testing problem where
0 < 02< 1/4 achieves almost sure learning with binary messages.
Rates of Convergence for Social Learning with Binary Messages
Lobel et al. [LADO09] show that convergence to the correct decision is faster than a polynomial
rate when private beliefs have polynomial shape.' They consider unbounded private beliefs
with polynomial distributions, defined as Fo(x) = x - X2 under HO and F1(x) = X2 under H1,
x in [0,1]. They show that an optimal strategy achieves a probability of error that decays as
E(t- 1) [LADO09, Section IV]. This suggests that the sum of private errors diverges, leaving
open the possibility that the network does not converge almost surely in this case. Indeed, we
conjecture that it does not.
Learning Almost Surely with Three Messages
Given the examples in the previous two sections, we conjecture that in the unbounded likelihood
ratio case, a tandem network operating myopically with three-valued messages does not always
learn almost surely, but that it does for certain special cases. The following theorem might
prove useful for the cases in which the network does not converge a.s. in the binary case.
Theorem 5. In the unbounded likelihood ratio case, a tandem network that does not learn
almost surely with two-valued messages, will not learn almost surely with three-valued messages.
We proceed with a proof by contradiction, that starts exactly like the proof of Theorem 1.
We suppose that the myopic sequence of messages converges a.s. and consider the corresponding
finite state Markov chains (AO) and (A I), under hypotheses HO and H1, respectively.
We construct two new Markov chains (B ) and (B/IH) from (AH ) and (A I) as follows: if
(AH ) transitions from state "0" into state " * , (B H,) transitions from "0" to "1",; if (Ao)
transitions from state "1" into state "*", (BJ) switches from "1" to "0". For (B/J1), the same
procedure is used with the roles of states "0" and "1" interchanged. The transition probabilities
are shown in Figure 5-3.
6 Their model is similar to the one we use, except agents communicate with binary messages. They refer to
the tandem topology as "immediate neighbor sampling".
H * H 000 0 0
* I * q
H: H:0 
1
PPO +p1
p11 q11
Figure 5-3: Markov Chains (AHO) and (AI) (above), (BHO) and (B[") (below). If (Ato) and (Af')
converge a.s., then so do (BHO) and (B I), yielding a contradiction.
It follows from (5.1-5.3) and the Borel-Cantelli Lemma that that (B HO) converges to state
"0" wpl. A parallel argument can be used to prove that (B/I) converges to state "1" wpl. This
is a contradiction because if (BHi) converges to state "i" wpl, for i = 0, 1, we have specified
a possible sequence of strategies 'Y1, 72, - that learns almost surely with two-valued messages
and unbounded beliefs, contradicting our conjectured result for the two-valued messages case.
Chapter 6
An Experimental Test of Social
Learning
We take an experimental look at a variant of the social learning model discussed previously,
and investigate empirical evidence for the findings. We report an experimental test of how
individuals learn by observing the behavior of their immediate predecessors. Our experimental
design is based on the ball-and-urn observational learning experiments paradigm laid out by
Anderson and Holt [AH97] and extended by Qelen and Kariv [QK05]. In particular, we adopt
the continuous signal-space and cutoff elicitation method in [QK04a]. Our contribution to the
experimental learning literature is two-fold. First, our experiment looks at the case of ternary
actions, whereas the information cascades literature has been surprisingly limited to binary-
signal-binary-action. Second, we introduce the use of Amazon Mechanical Turk as a powerful
framework to run learning experiments. We replicate results in the experimental economics
literature, and extend them to the three-valued actions case. The experimental economics
literature has so far mostly focused on the use of student subjects in a laboratory setting. We
find that herd behavior is less frequent with ternary actions than binary actions. A heuristic
where agents follow their own signal seems to be better predictor of behavior than Bayesian
rationality - more so than in the binary case.
6.1 Motivation
Information cascades arise when individuals rationally choose identical actions despite having
different private information. In economic environments where decision makers have imperfect
information about the true state of the world, it can be rational to ignore one's own private
information and make decisions based on what are believed to be more informative public
signals. In particular, if decisions are made sequentially and some or all of the earlier decisions
become publicly known, information cascades may emerge. They are observed in a variety of
settings, from bank runs and technology adoption, to mass hysteria, medical treatment choices,
and political campaigns. They also play an important role in financial markets, most notably
in the context of bubbles and crashes.
It is difficult to test information cascades empirically, because the effects of reputation,
bounded rationality, and payoff externalities are often entangled in empirical data. This prob-
lem can be overcome in an experimental design in which we can isolate control variables - in
particular, private information that agents have when making decisions, as well as information
aggregation mechanisms. In our experiment, three decision makers receive incomplete private
information about an unknown state of the world, and observe one or all past actions. Given
both their private signal and their observations, they choose, sequentially and according to a
predetermined order, whether they want to guess which of two states of the world is true, or
whether they will abstain from guessing, at a cost. Such a binary-signal-ternary-action setup
has not been examined in the literature, and raises key questions about the effect of a richer
yet still limited communication structure on the information pipeline.
6.2 Hypotheses
We set out to investigate a setting where the number of actions is different from that of alter-
native hypotheses. We argue the latter is a particularly adequate representation for learning in
settings where an agent has the option to declare a cheaper "don't know" action, rather than
to make an uncertain costly guess of what hypothesis is true.
Questions that motivate this design are:
e Do subjects, in problems to which they have allotted finite memory (such as "yes," "in-
different" and "no") demonstrate learning procedures similar to the ones suggested in the
binary case?
" How do the convergence results (herding/information cascades/learning) compare? Is the
Bayesian model (or a some mix of a Bayesian and irrational decision maker) capable of
explaining the results?
" How often do we observe imitation and switches along the tandem when the option of
passing is allowed at a cost?
The hypotheses that we propose to test are:
(1) Decision makers update information according to Bayes' Rule and recognize the cascade
behavior of others across information and payoff structures, specifically:
(1a) Subjects tend to rely more on the information revealed by the predecessor's action
rather their private signal as their position increases.
(1b) In line with the theoretical results, early moving players choose clear-cut signaling
guesses and later players are able to decipher them and act accordingly.
(1') Alternatively, decision makers are Bayes rational, but do not take into account the ratio-
nality or cascade behavior of others.
(2) The frequency of herding is lower, and that of action switches is higher when a third
"Passing" or "No Trading" option is allowed.
6.3 Experimental Design
As a step towards investigating the above hypotheses, we propose a simple design based on the
the number of alternative decisions (binary or ternary) available to agents. We adopt the same
local payoff structure described in Chapter 4, where agents each attempt to maximize their local
payoff. We also use the imperfect information setup defined in Chapter 3, where an agent only
knows the decision of her immediate predecessor. As opposed to previous experimental designs
[AH97, QK04a], we examine a network of n = 3 agents. 1 In the first, baseline, treatment,
in = 3 is big enough to allow the observation of learning patterns while still being theoretically tractable.
How these patterns extend to longer tandems could be explored in a further experiment, but is outside the scope
of this design.
subjects choose one of two actions. In the second treatment, subjects choose one of three
actions.
A round consists of 3 decision problems, or rounds where subjects are randomly assigned
a decision turn. Common to both treatments are the following features. In each round, every
subject receives a private signal in the form of a number chosen uniformly at random in the set
of real numbers [-10, 10] (rounded to 2 decimal points). Subjects then have to choose between
alternative actions 1 or 0, and possibly a third option of passing, or no guessing, denoted *.
Action 1 yields 2.5 cents only if the sum of all private signals is positive (H1 is true), and
otherwise yields zero. Action 0 yields 2.5 cents only if the sum of all private signals is negative
(Ho is true), and otherwise yields zero. Action * yields an unconditional lower profit regardless
of private signals. 2
6.4 Experimental Procedures
We conducted the above experiment3 using the Amazon Mechanical Turk service. Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) is an Internet service provided by Amazon that gives developers the ability
to pay people small rewards to do human computation tasks. It is sometimes referred to as
a crowdsourcing 4 or micro-task marketplace, and an artificial artificial intelligence system, in
the sense that it uses human powered artificial intelligence. 5 Developers use the Amazon web
services API to submit tasks (or Human Intelligence Tasks, HITs) to the MTurk web site, review
completed tasks, and integrate the results into their applications.
We use TurKit, a toolkit for programming iterative processes on MTurk developed by the
MIT User Interface Design group. Little et al. [LCMG09] present a number of examples of
iterative tasks, involving iterative text improvement and sorting, where they ask turkers to
label images, brainstorm, vote on each other's output or act as comparison functions in a sort
algorithm. Following guidelines presented in [KCS08, SF08], as well as the "cutoff elicitation"
2As an important technical point, this setup differs from the model presented in Chapter 3 in that the private
signals are conditionally dependent given the state of the world.
3 MIT institutional review board approval, for use of human subjects in research, was obtained for this study
under COUHES Protocol# 0905003265.
4According to Wikipedia, crowdsourcing is "a neologism for the act of taking a task traditionally performed
by an employee or contractor, and outsourcing it to an undefined, generally large group of people or community
in the form of an open call."
5 1n 1769, Wolfgang von Kempelen built a chess automaton that toured the United States and Europe for years,
defeating such famous opponents as Benjamin Franklin, Napolean Bonaparte, and Edgar Allen Poe [Sta02]. The
secret to the automaton was in fact a human chess master hidden inside of the wooden mannequin.
method introduced in [QK04a], we design our tasks to elicit specific information regarding
strategies and we attempt to reduce invalid answers. Instructions are attached as Appendix B.
6.5 Theory
The Network: Agents and Interaction As in Chapter 4, the underlying state of the world,
H is unknown, and assumed to be binary, i.e., H E {H 0, H1}, with equal prior probabilities. The
economy consists of a finite number n of Bayesian rational agents indexed by t = 1, 2, -.- , n.
In this design, we consider n = 3 agents. Each agent t makes a once-in-a-lifetime decision: to
choose action 1 profitable under H0 , to choose action 0 profitable under H1, or to Pass - and
say "I don't know". These decisions correspond to Mt = 1, 0 and * respectively. Agents make
their decisions sequentially according to a predetermined random order.
Each agent t forms her belief about the state of the world based on:
1. a private signal Xt about the realization of the state of the world, independently generated
according to a uniform distribution over [-1, 1]. 6 Private signals are thus bounded and
their support is continuous and symmetric around zero.
2. unless t = 1, the action of her predecessor Mt_1, which can take one of three values
{1, 0, *}.
The Payoff: Selfish Structure We adopt the same local or selfish setup as in Chapter 4,
where each agent's payoff is represented by the payoff function H(Mt), normalized for simplicity
of notation, and defined as follows
if Mt= 1 and H = Hi: 1 Xk > 0 or if Mt = 0 and H =H 0 : E"_, Xt < 0;
II(M) c = 3/5 if M = *;
0 otherwise.
In other words, agents who pick action 1 earn +1 if the sum of all private signals is positive (H 1
is true), and nothing otherwise. On the other hand, agents who pick action 0 earn +1 if the sum
of all private signals is negative (Ho is true), and nothing otherwise. Agents who pick action
6We scale the distribution support from [-10, 10] to [-1,1] for purposes of the analysis.
* earn c = 3/5 regardless of private signals. 7 Also, we consider the binary case (equivalent to
c = 0).
Information Structure: Perfect vs. Imperfect Information We use the imperfect in-
formation economy setup, where decision makers are not informed of the full history of actions
taken, but only of their predecessor's decision, that is, for any agent t > 1,
It = {Xt, Mt-1}.
The information structure is assumed to be common knowledge; therefore every agent is assumed
to know whose actions other agents observe.
The Decision Problem Given her information set It, each agent t's strategy is a mapping
from the space of private signals and predecessor's action back into the set of actions, according
to some decision rule -': = It(1). Her decision problem consists of maximizing her expected
payoff. More formally, given all possible decision rules F available to an agent t and her payoff
function II, agent t picks a strategy -yt such that
7, = arg maxE[Ilt(-(1t- 1 )].
-YE F
Proposition 1. In the binary action case, there exists an optimal strategy for an agent t that
is a threshold strategy.
(i) For the first agent t = 1, the optimal decision rule 'Y1 consists of following the sign of the
private signal,
KXi) {0, if X1 < 0;
1, if X1 > 0.
(ii) For each agent t = 2 and 3, there exists a threshold at > 0 such that t will always follow
her predecessor, unless her private signal is higher than at or lower than -at, in which
7The payoff c of action * needs to be at least 0.5, otherwise it is never optimal to choose it.
Figure 6-1: Binary Actions - Theoretical thresholds as a function of player's position in the
tandem.
case, switching is optimal.
-It(Xt, Mt_ 1) =
0,
1,
if Xt < -at and MtI = 1 or Xt < at and Mt_1 = 0;
if Xt at and M 1 = 0 or Xt -at and Mt_1 = 1.
We calculate a2 = 1/2 and a3 = Vi - 2.
Proof. Each agent t wishes to maximize her expected payoff given her information set, i.e.,
max E[IIt(y(It_1)] = max [P(Ho, It, Mt = 0) + P(H1, It, Mt = 1)].
7 7
Knowing only her private signal X 1, Player 1 picks action 0 when P(Ho|X1) > 1/2. Equiv-
alently, she picks action 1 when P(H|X1) <; 1/2. To show that such a strategy is indeed a
threshold strategy, we can express P(HolX1) as a function of X 1
P(Ho|X1) = P(X 1 + X 2 + X 3 < OIX1) = P(X 2 + X3 < -X1 |X1 ).
Using the cumulative distribution function of X 2 + X3, we show that an optimal strategy for
8See Appendix A for an explicit CDF.
Player 1 consists of a threshold rule because
P(Ho lX1) > 1/2 Fx2+x3 (-X1) > 1/2 X1 < 0.
Player 2 observes Player l's decision in addition to her private signal X 2. Again, she maxi-
mizes her payoff by picking action 0 when P(HoIMi, X 2) > 1/2. We rewrite this probability as
a function of X2 when Mi = 0 as follows,
P(HoMi= 0, X 2 ) = P(HoIX 1 < 0, X 2)
= P(X1 +X 3 <-X 2|X1 <O,X 2).
Using the cumulative distribution of X1 + X 3 conditioned on X1 < 0,' we show that an optimal
strategy for Player 2 consists of a threshold rule because
P(HoIM1 0, X 2) > 1/2 e Fxl+x3|Ml=o(-X2) > 1/2 X 2 < 1/2
P(HoIM1 1, X 2) > 1/2 e Fxl+x3|Ml=l(-X 2 ) > 1/2 X 2 < -1/2,
where the first line results from solving for X2 in the inequality Fx 1+X 3|M1 o(-X 2) > 1/2, and
the second line follows from symmetry.
Similarly, Player 3 observes Player 2's decision in addition to her private signal X3. Again,
she maximizes her payoff by picking action 0 when P(HofM 2, X 3 ) > 1/2. Suppose Player 3
observes Player 2's decision M2 = 0. Player 2 might have copied Player 1 (if X1 < 0 and
X 2 < 1/2) or she might have switched given a low enough private signal (if X 1 > 0 and
X 2 < -1/2). By a simple Bayes' Rule application, Player 3 assigns probability 3/4 to the
91bid.
former case (Mi = 0|M 2  0), and 1/4 to the latter (Mi 1|M 2 = 0), so that
3 1P(HoIM2 =0,X3) = P(HoIM1 = 0, M2 = 0, X 3) + P(HIM1 = 1, M2 0, X3 )44
3 1
= P(Ho IX1 < 0, X 2 < - X 3 ) +4 2'
1 1
-P(HoIX1 > O,X2 <- , X 3 )4 2
3 1
-P(X 1 + X 2 < -X 3|X1 < 0, X 2 < , X 3) +4 2
1 1
-P(X 1 + X 2 < -X 3|X 1 > 0, X 2 < 2'4 2
Using the cumulative distribution of X 1 +X 2 conditioned on M2 = 0,10 we show that an optimal
strategy for Player 3 consists of a threshold rule because
P(HoM 2 =0, X 3) > 1/2 # Fx1 +x2j2=o(-X 3) > 1/2 # X3 < -- 2
P(Ho|M2 = 1, X 3) > 1/2 # Fx 1 +x 2 2=1 (-X 3) > 1/2 # X 3 < 2 - v2.
We note that this last threshold is different from Qelen and Kariv's (5/8), though their ex-
perimental payoff structure is identical to ours [QK05). While their theoretical framework has
a different payoff structure than the one used in their experimental tests,11 we believe our
calculation makes sense given our underlying assumptions. l
Proposition 2. In the ternary action case, there exists an optimal strategy for an agent t that
is a threshold strategy.
(i) For the first agent t = 1, there exists a pair of thresholds (a1, 01), such that,
0, if X1 < a1;
71 (X1) =*, if ce < X1 < /31;-
1, if X1 ;> 1.
For our game, we calculate thresholds a1 = -4v'5/5 + 2 and 01 - 4/5/5 - 2.
(ii) For each agent t = 2, 3, there exist 3 pairs of thresholds (at", M -1), Mt 1 = 1, *, 0
I0 Ibid.
"Their theoretical framework sets the payoff to be equal to the sum of private signals [QK04b], while their
experiments reward correct decisions with a fixed $2.
such that,
0, if Xt < at1
7t(X, M_1) *,if am*-1 < Xt < Ot'-1;
1, if Xt > 3;t 1
For our game, we calculate the following thresholds
a 2 = (13 - 4V5)/10 3 = (17 - 4vF5)/10
Agent 2 a* = -1/5 02 = 1/5
a (4v/5 - 17)/10 3 = (4V5 - 13)/10
a =2- 4v3/5 = 2 - 4v/2/5
Agent 3 a* = 2(2v/5+ /35 - 12v/5)/5 - 3 # = 3 - 2(2v/5+ V/35 - 12v'5)/5
a' = 4v_/5 - 2 #33_ = 4v'5/5 - 2
1.00
0.80
0.60 -
0.40
- 0.20 -0-0l
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Figure 6-2: Ternary Actions - Theoretical thresholds as a function of player's position in the
tandem. autl and #Mt-1 represent the optimal lower and higher cutoffs respectively, given the
predecessor's action Mt- 1 = 0, 1, *.
Proof. Wishing to maximize his payoff and knowing only his private signal X1, Player 1 picks
action 0 when P(HoIX 1 ) > c, where c is the payoff for passing. Equivalently, he picks action
1 when P(H1 iX 1) > c. To show that such a strategy is indeed a threshold strategy, we can
express P(HoIXi) as a function of X 1 as follows,
P(HoIXi) = P(X 1 + X 2 + X 3 < OX 1) = P(X 2 + X 3 < -X1).
Using the cumulative distribution of X 2 + X 3 ,12 we show that an optimal strategy for Player 1
consists of a threshold rule because
P(HolX 1) > c e Fx 2 + 3(-X1) > c X 1 < 2( 2(1 - c) - 1)
P(H1IX1) > c ' Fx2 +x 3 (-X 1 ) < 1 - c X 1 > -2(/2(1 - c) - 1).
Since our model assumes c = 3/5, we calculate threshold ai = -4v/5/5 + 2 and #1 = -ai.
Player 2 observes Player 1's decision in addition to her private signal X2. Again, he maxi-
mizes his payoff by picking action 0 when P(Ho I M1, X 2) > c. Using the cumulative distribution
of X 1 +X 3 conditioned on M1 = 0, i.e., X 1 < 1,13 we show that an optimal strategy for Player
2 consists of a threshold rule because
P(HolM1 0, X2) > c Fxl+X3|M 1 o~(-X2) > c X 2 < a2
P(HiM1 0, X2) > c Fx 1+x 3|Ml=o(-X2) < 1 - c X 2 > /21,
where we calculate a = (13 - 4V5-)/10 and #23 = (17 - 4v/5)/10 from the CDF for c = 3/5.
Repeating the same process for M1 = 1 and M1  *, we calculate the remaining 4 thresholds
for Agent 2 shown in Proposition 2(ii) above.
Player 3 observes Player 2's decision in addition to his private signal X3. Again, he maximizes
his payoff by picking action 0 when P(HoIM 2, X 3) > c. Suppose Player 3 observes that Player
2 picked M2= 0. Player 3 knows this happened in one of three ways:
* Player 2 copied Player 1 (if X1 < a1 and X 2 < ao). Using Bayes' Rule, this happens with
probability p0 = (a' + 1)(1 + ai)/(a' + 1)(1 + ai) + (aO + 1)(1 - 31) + (a* + 1)(#1 - ai).
" Player 2 overturned Player l's decision from 1 to 0 given a low enough private signal (if
12See Appendix A for an explicit CDF.13Ibid.
X 1 > #1 and X2 < al). This happens with probability pl = (ac +1)(1 - 1)/(a + 1)(1+
ai) + (aC + 1)(1 - 1) + (a* + 1)(f1 - c1).
Player 2 overturned Player l's decision from * to 1 given a low enough private signal (if
ai < X1 < #1 and X2 < as). his happens with probability p* = (a* + 1)I - ai)/(a) +
1)(oe ) + ( + 11) + (a* + 1 - ).
Therefore,
p P(HoIM1 = 0, M2 = 0, X 3) + P1 P(H|M1  1, M 2 =0, X 3 )
+p* P(HoM1 *, M2 = 0, X 3)
p P(Ho|X1 < a 1 , X 2 < aX 3 )
+ p P(Ho lX1 > 11, X 2 < a,X 3)
+p* P(Holai < X1 < #1, X 2 < a*, X 3)
p2 P(X1 + X 2 < -X 3 |X1 < ai, X 2 < a0, X 3 )
+ pl P(X 1 + X 2 < -X 3|X1 ;> #1, X 2 < aX 3)
+p* P(X1 + X 2 < -X 3|ai < X 1 < 01, X 2 < a*,X 3).
Using the cumulative distribution of X 1 + X2 conditioned on M2
strategy for Player 3 consists of a threshold rule because
P(HoIM1 = 0, X 3 ) > c * Fx 1 +X2 |M2 =(-X 3 ) > c
P(H1IM1 = 0, X3) > c # Fx 1+X2 |M2 =o(-X3) < 1 -
0, 14we show that an optimal
4 X 3 < 0l
c 
_ 
X3>#3-
6.6 Experimental Results
6.6.1 Descriptive Statistics - Group behavior
We use the distinction between herding and cascade behavior established in [QK05); A subject
engages in cascade behavior when she disregards her private signal, and reports a cutoff of -10
14Ibid.
P(Ho|M2 = 0,X3)
Table 6.1: Summary of Group Behavior Results.
Group Behavior Tenary Action Binary Action
#Rounds 51 51
Earnings per decision(cents) 1.54 1.5
%Correct Final Decision 23 29
%Pass Final Decision 19 N/A
%Incorrect Final Decision 9 22
Herds* 6 12
%of Herds** 11.8% 23.5%
Cascades 1 1
%of Cascades** 2% 2%
Overturns*** 64 48
% of Overturns*** 62.8% 47.1%
* of all 3 subjects.
** Out of all 51 rounds.
*** Out of all decision points excluding the first decision turn.
or 10. Alternatively, a subject engages in herding behavior when she reports a cutoff different
than -10 or 10, but still ends up picking the same action as her predecessor. A cascade is said
to occur when at least the last 2 subjects follow cascade behavior. A herd is said to occur when
all three subjects follow herd behavior.
Table 6.1 summarizes our experimental results at the group level. With ternary actions,
herds were observed in 6 out of the 51 sessions(11.8%). All herds were correct (i.e., consistent
with optimal behavior) except one. With binary actions, herds were observed in 12 out of the 51
sessions(23.5%), 9 of which were correct. Herds were less frequent and overturns more frequent
with ternary actions,. Finally, no significant difference was found in the earnings between two
treatments, or the frequency of cascades. The ternary action group involves a significantly lower
percentage of incorrect final decisions (defined as the decision of the third member), though this
can be attributed to the fact a substantial number of subjects chose to pass.
6.6.2 Descriptive Statistics - Individual behavior
Table 6.2 summarizes our experimental results at the individual level. A lower correct and
incorrect decision rate is achieved in the ternary case compared to the binary case - this can
be attributed to the fact approximately a third of players choose to pass. Cascade behavior is
less frequent in the ternary case, and its frequency matches that reported in classroom exper-
Table 6.2: Summary of Individual Behavior Results
Individual Behavior Tenary Action Binary Action
%Correct Decision 39.2% 54.9%
%Pass Decision 37.9% N/A
%Incorrect Decision 22.9% 45.1%
Information Cascade Behavior 3 8
%Information Cascade Behavior 5.6% 7.8%
Unconditional Passing 8 N/A
%Unconditional Passing 5.2% N/A
Concurring Decisions 24.5% 42.2%
Contrary Decisions 72.6% 54.9%
Neutral Decisions 3% 3%
iments in the binary case. A somewhat surprising finding is that very few subjects choose to
unconditionally pass in the ternary case, i.e., to set their lower and upper cutoffs to -10 and
10 respectively.
We again borrow the terminology used in [QK05] to give more color to the decisions reported:
in particular, we distinguish between concurring, contrary, and neutral decisions. A subject
makes a concurring decision if she picks a positive(negative) cutoff when she observes that her
predecessor picked action 1(0). She makes a neutral decision if she picks zero cutoffs. She
makes a contrary decision otherwise. Partitioning the data into these three categories gives
more insight into the decision mechanisms at work.
Overall, subjects tended to weigh their predecessor's action far less than the theory predicts.
In the ternary action group, over all decisions excluding first turns, only 24.5% of decisions were
concurring, and 72.5% were contrary. In the binary case, we get a less severe breakdown, with
42.2% concurring decisions, and 54.9% contrary.
If we condition on contrary decisions, the intensity of disagreement is severe - when subjects
disagree with their predecessor's action, they do so in an extreme way. Similar to [QK05],
we measure the intensity of disagreement in two different ways: Disagreement 1 measures the
absolute value of the distance between the cutoff actually chosen and the theoretical cutoff
rule. Disagreement 2 measures the absolute value of the distance of the chosen cutoff from
zero. Figure 6-3 presents the results in the binary action group. Our results seem to reproduce
the severity of the disagreement reported in the classroom setting [QK05]. If we condition on
concurring decisions, we find interesting conformity of behavior with the theory prediction in
Figure 6-3: Binary Action Group - Strength of disagreement of contrary decisions, based on
[QK05]. Disagreement 1 measures distance from the theoretical cutoffs. Disagreement 2 mea-
sures distance from zero.
the binary case. Figure 6-4 presents the theoretical cutoffs and the mean cutoff (in magnitude)
of concurring decisions turn by turn. Bayesian learning does seem to capture the magnitude of
the cutoffs adopted by the subjects in this instance. Figure 6-5 shows that in the ternary action
group, subjects tend to follow their private information much more than in the binary case.
Figure 6-6 shows that the compositional difference that was obtained by conditioning the data
on concurrent and contrary decisions in the binary case does not seem to apply in the ternary
case.
When the results are not conditioned on concurring or contrary data, a significant difference
appears to exist between experimental findings and theoretical predictions. We find, as did
[QK05, Wei08], that the heuristic of following one's private signal is a better predictor of behav-
ior than Bayesian learning. In the binary action group, we are able to replicate the experimental
literature finding that the difference from the prediction of the theory is a compositional differ-
ence over concurring and contrary decisions and not a reflection of how persuasive predecessors
actions are once they are followed. We were not able to replicate this finding in the ternary
action group. The heuristic of following one's private signal seems a better predictor of behavior
4 Disagreement 1 -M-Disagreement 2
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Figure 6-4: Binary Action Group - Conditional and Unconditional cutoff means by position.
Exp Cutoff Mean refer to the experimental cutoff mean calculated from the binary action data.
Weakly concurring decisions include both concurring and neutral decisions.
than Bayesian learning in the ternary case, whether or not results are conditioned on concurring
or contrary data.
6.7 Discussion
MTurk. A number of limitations should be emphasized concerning our use of MTurk, some
of which are specific to observational learning experiments, while others are common to online
experimentation in general. Despite the limitations of this particular medium however, we were
able to closely reproduce the findings of the experimental literature in the binary action group.
" The unknown nature of MTurk's user base is a double edged sword: because of its diversity,
it can potentially generalize to a wider population, increasing the experiment's external
validity. In contrast, the limited experimenter contact, the unknown expertise of the user
base and the possibility of self-selection bias might be problematic.
" The complex nature of the experiment, and the need to synchronize across different players
raise important challenges to guaranteeing quality assurance, in particular (a) making sure
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Figure 6-5: Ternary Action Group - Conditional and Unconditional experimental mean cutoffs
by position t. a"-_ and 3 Mt1 refer to the lower and upper cutoffs respectively given the
predecessor picked action Mt_1 = 0, 1, *. The dashed line shows the unconditional experimental
mean. No compositional difference emerges when conditioning the data on concurrent and
contrary decisions.
S exp concurrent ct mean (absolute
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Figure 6-6: Ternary Action Group - Conditional cutoff means by position, excluding subjects
who picked *. Exp o and 13 means refer to the experimental lower and upper cutoff mean
calculated from the ternary action data. Theor cutoffs refer to the theoretical cutoffs calculated
in Proposition 2.
Table 6.3: Illustrations of Heuristics I - Comments taken from questionnaire.
Bayesian heuristics:
- Player 2 said pos because he has a pos number or high neg. and #1 said pos; or he had a
very high postive and #1 said neg. More likely #1 said pos then so #2 has pos or high neg.
So I will guess pos if I have high neg or better.
With a moderate amount of information and a negative sum predicted I would need to see
a fairly positive number to guess positive.
- Since the player before me picked negative sum I would assume that either: 1. He has a
large negative number (-8 -9 or -10) 2. He is near zero but the player before him guessed
negative sum I would assume that the aggregate up to me was negative and unless my number
was quite large (7 or higher) I would guess negative sum.
- I assume that since the guy before me was 1st and picked positive he had a positive number.
Since there is one positive already I am going to lean to there being a slightly higher chance
of finishing completely positive. If he was thinking logically he only would guess positive if
he has a STRONG (> 5) positive number as the normal average would be to tend towards 0.
Influence of position:
- I was fairly influenced by his/her guess. Since we are fairly early I assume that the guesses
so far are more accurate than the later ones in the game.
Anchoring and adjusting heuristic (previous player guessed a negative sum therefore I
adjusted down to reach a positive sum) Given my position in the order I would say the number
my neighbor picked would weigh highly if they understood the parameters of the game.
that players understand the requested task and try to perform it well; (b) recovering from
errors; and (c) detecting and preventing cheating.
" MTurk works best when tasks admit a bona fide response. Because our experiment consists
of collecting user beliefs, it is harder to spot turkers who provide completely random
answers to minimize the amount of time spent on each task.
" The lack of full control of the experimental setting raises important questions concerning
the ecological validity of the findings. Differences in concentration levels or browsing
experiences may significantly impact findings.
Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 present illustrative quotes from the questionnaire collected from
subjects at the end of each decision round. The first two discuss examples of heuristics used,
whereas the third highlights limitations we encountered in our experiment.
Table 6.4: Illustrations of Heuristics II - Comments taken from questionnaire.
Non Bayesian Heuristics:
- I chose 6 and negative 6 because it makes just more than half in each direction.
- I realized if I picked 0 and never pass I'd be in a better position to get a bonus. I didn't
weigh the decision of my neighbor at all.
- Looking for the largest bonus forces me to try to keep my pass zone width small. It cannot
be a width of 0 without eliminating the zone entirely or biasing it to the negative (-1 and 0)
or to the positive (0 and 1). I haven't used the decision from my neighbor since they're the
2nd to play the game. I've centered my guess around 0.
- Since previous guess was pass I assume it was near zero so unless there is a strong negative
or positive the average will tend to zero. So limits were picked to snag only strong in either
direction. I weighed the previous guess the same as my number.
Risk Aversion:
- The players guesses have no impact on the actual sum of the numbers fixed once they
have been chosen. Neighbors guesses are irrelevant to choice I make. The expected sum is
zero. If you choose either positive or negative you should expect to win half of the time. The
expected payout is therefore half of 2.5 cents or 1.25 cents. By passing your payout is 1.5
cents. Setting the lower cutoff to -10 and the upper cutoff to 10 will force a pass.
- guaranteed pass (better payoff than 2.5/2 odds).
- Since you have little data to use for statistical accuracy I set the range to the near extreme
since I rather take a near 100% chance at 1.5 cents than a 50% chance at 2.5. 2. My
neighbors guess had no influence on my decision because I have little clue as to what he put
as his range.
Table 6.5: Illustrations of loss of experimental control - Comments taken from questionnaire.
Failure to recognize that own reward depended on cutoffs
not a game:
- I guessed and that's about it. Zero is the hero!
- Age=51=5+1=6 Game no=45=5+4=9 9-6=3.
- You offered a bonus of six cents so naturally the number in front
- Sum of zipcode is 7.
- Favorite/lucky number.
and guesses of others -
of my eye is 6.
Tendency to guess positive:
- People tend to guess on the positive side-human nature.
Failure to understand how rewards are determined.
- I believe extremes are best.
- I like to guess high.
- Based solely on intuition.
- Wild guess.
Failure to understand probabilistic concepts:
- If it is truly random the probability should be high that the sum equals zero.
Assuming that all the numbers assigned are completely random it is safe to guess that the
sum of the numbers would be above -5 but below 10.
General lack of attention:
- I don't really understand how this game works.
- I was a bit lost.
6.8 Notes
Pilot. Appendix C presents the instructions of an in-class experiment that we conducted
earlier in the term as part of an MIT class recitation for 6.986 - Fundamentals of Network Science
and Engineering : this "pilot" effort" occurred in a one hour recitation with 14 student subjects
who were divided into 2 control groups, with binary vs. ternary decisions. Instead of guessing
whether the sum of private signals is positive or negative as proposed in the above design,
students were told that one of two possible states of the world, Ho or H1, is true with equal
prior probabilities. The attached instructions correspond to the +T(ternary actions) treatment.
Results showed the emergence of learning regularities in the both treatments, with shorter
periods of uniform behavior (shorter cascades) in the ternary than in the binary condition, and
more frequent switches. Logistically, the pilot experiment suggested it would be beneficial to
move away from Gaussian formulations, which were not always well understood. Additionally,
the exercise showed that it would be beneficial to use computer terminals to facilitate the flow
of information as opposed to paper slips.
Context. We considered wording the instructions in a more concrete way, by attributing
meaning to private signals and more generally to the type of information being shared. Possible
concretizing routes involve framing decisions in the context of:
" A disease test: Private information would be presented as the result of a disease test, and
the decision would be whether a patient has the disease or not.
" Investment opportunities: Private information would correspond to the fundamental value
of one of two risky assets A or B, and the decision would be investing in A , B, or Not
Trading.
" A job interview: Private information would be presented as the result of a performance on
an interview of a given candidate, and the decision would be whether to hire the candidate
or not.
* "Bandwagon effects": Private information would correspond to input from the media
about certain consumer products, and the decision would incorporate consumer purchase
choices.
1 5This experiment is reported here in the spirit of following the "methodological exhortation" outlined in
"Keeping the Con Out of Experimental Econ." [Rot94]
While these interpretations might increase the understanding of the experimental setup, we
abstained from including them in order to avoid introducing biases (especially related to risk
aversion).
Private Signal Structure. We initially considered discrete private signals (like those used
in Anderson and Holt) but realized a move to a continuous signal space would allow for a richer
exploration of cascades, specifically for the ternary actions and perfect information group.
6.9 Conclusion
We presented a design to test an imperfect-information observational learning model using
Amazon Mechanical Turk. Applying procedures from [QK05] such as continuous signals, discrete
actions and a cutoff elicitation technique, we test how well Bayesian learning approximates the
actual behavior observed in the laboratory.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, imitation and herd behavior are much
less frequent with ternary actions than with binary actions. Because herds are rarer, overturns
and contrary decisions are more frequent with ternary actions. We also find strong evidence
that behavior is less consistent with the predictions of Bayes' rationality in the ternary case.
Whereas conditioning on concurrent decisions shows some uniformity with Bayesian learning
in the binary case, no such consistency emerges with ternary actions. A somewhat surprising
finding is that very few subjects choose to unconditionally pass. This leaves open the question
of how the size of payoffs affects outcomes in economics experiments. 16
16We would expect a higher number to unconditionally pass if the reward for passing was higher.

Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Research Summary
We examined learning in a setting where agents receive noisy signals about the underlying
state of the world, and communicate using three-valued messages. We extended the literature
results that were applicable to binary actions, distinguishing between learning in probability
and almost surely. Our main results proved that tandem networks do not learn (almost surely
or in probability) with three-valued messages when the signal structure of the private messages
is bounded. We also prove that tandem networks learn in probability when private messages
are unbounded.
In addition, we examined experimental tests of a learning model with imperfect information
and ternary actions. We used crowdsourcing (Amazon Mechanical Turk) to run observational
learning experiments. We tested the robustness of literature results based on experiments in
the classroom, and were able to replicate the findings in the binary action case and use them
as a benchmark. We extended the experimental setup to games with three actions, and found
that herd behavior is less frequent with ternary actions than binary actions. We also found that
with three actions, behavior in the laboratory is much less consistent with Bayesian rationality
than the theory predicts. A heuristic where agents follow their own signal seems to be better
predictor of behavior - more so than in the binary case.
While real-world social and economic networks are more complex than the sequential topol-
ogy investigated here, our results do offer insights into sequential decision making, and the way
opinions propagate in a setting with imperfect information.
7.2 Areas for Future Research
There are many directions in which this research can be extended meaningfully: It is natural to
ask about more general network topologies, and to generalize to any number of hypotheses and
messages. Further extensions of the framework could explore topologies where the same decision
maker makes more than one decision, and remembers a subset of the signals she has received in
the past. On the experimental side, future work might consider more elaborate factorial designs,
for instance ones that, in addition to the the number of alternative decisions, would incorporate
(i) the payoff structure(global/collaborative vs. local/selfish), (ii) the structure of information
(perfect information where agents know all previous decisions, vs. imperfect information like in
our design, where an agent only knows the decision of her immediate predecessor), (iii) length
of network, and (iv) situating decisions, e.g., gambling games, workplace or voting decisions.
Appendix A
Thresholds Calculation
We list the cumulative distribution functions used for calculating thresholds in Chapter 6,
Section 6.5.
A.1 Distribution Functions - Binary Messages
The CDF of X 2 + X3 is given by
0,
(2 + y) 2 /8,
(4 + 4y - y2 )/8,
1,
for y < -2.
if -2 < y < 0
if 0 < y < 2
for y > 2.
The CDF of X 1 + X3 conditioned on Player 1 picking action 0 is given by
Fx 1+x31M1=o(y) =
0,
(2 + y) 2 /4,
(3 + 2y)/4,
(3 + 2y - y
1,
for y < -2.
if -2 < y < -1
if -1 < y < 0
if 0 < y < 1
for y > 1.
2)/4,
Fx2+x3(y) =
The CDF of X 1 + X2 conditioned on Player 2 picking action 0 is given by
Fx1+x 2|M2=0(y) =
0,
(2 + y) 2/8,
(7 + 4y - 2y2)/8,
7 + 4y - 4y 2 )/8,
1,
for y<-2.
if -2 < y < 0
if 0 < y < 2
if 2 < y
for y> j
A.2 Distribution Functions - Ternary Messages
The CDF of X2+ X 3 is given by
0,
(2 + y) 2 /8,
(4 + 4y - y2 )/8,
1,
for y < -2.
if -2 < y < 0
if 0 < y < 2
for y > 2.
The CDF of X 1 + X3 conditioned on Player 1 picking action 0 is given by
0,
(-5 + 4v/5 + 5y) 2 /(20(-5 + 4v-5)),
- 1/4 + 1/V 5 + y/24,
(40 - 16v/ -+ 5(-4 + y)y)/(20 - 16v5),
1,
for y < 1 -4/v5.
if 1 - 4/v 5 < y < 0
if 0 < y < 3 - 4/vs5
if 3 - 4/v/5 y < 2
for y > 2.
Fx 2+x3 (y)=
Fx1+X3|M1=O(y) =
The CDF of X 1 + X2 conditioned on Player 2 picking action 0 is given by
0,
5(2 + y),
(3(37 + 8v/'5) - 10y(-26 + 8v/5 + 5y))/1 60,
-291/160 + 5V/5/4 + (2 - 5y)y/8,
(-291 + 200V5' + 10(4 - 15y)y)/160,
(31 + 56v5 - 20y(7 - 4V5- + 5y))/160,
1,
for y < -2.
if -2 < y < 3/10 - 2/v/5
if 3/10 - 2/v5 < y < -11/5 + 4/V5
if -11/5 + 4/v/5 < y < 0
if 0 < y < 9/5 - 4/v5
if 9/5 - 4/v/5 < y < (4v/5 - 7)/10
for y ;> 2/V5 - 7/10.
Fx1+x 2 |M2=0(y) =
70
Appendix B
Amazon Turk Instructions
B.1 Instructions for the Ternary Action Group
Please read these instructions very carefully to earn up to 8 cents of extra bonus! Feel free to
accept other similar HITs, though you will not be allowed to participate more than once in the
same round.
At the beginning of this game, the computer randomly picks 3 secret numbers from all
decimal numbers between -10 and 10. 3 players are each assigned one of the secret numbers,
and try to guess (one after the other) whether the sum of the 3 numbers is Positive or Negative.
" Unless you are the first player, you can see the guess of the player who played right before
you.
" Instead of letting you see the secret number assigned to you, we ask for your strategy
(given the guess of the previous player).
- We ask for your LOWER CUTOFF - the secret number below which you would guess
the sum of all 3 numbers is Negative.
- We ask for your UPPER CUTOFF - the secret number above which you would guess
the sum of all 3 numbers is Positive.
" If the secret number assigned to you is below your LOWER CUTOFF, the next player
will be told that you guessed that the sum of the numbers is Negative.
- You get a BONUS of 2.5 cents if the sum is indeed negative, nothing if the sum
is positive.
" If the secret number assigned to you was above your UPPER CUTOFF, the next player
will be told that you guessed the sum of the numbers is Positive.
- You get a BONUS of 2.5 cents if the sum is indeed positive, nothing if the sum is
negative.
" If the secret number is between your LOWER CUTOFF and UPPER CUTOFF, the next
player will be told your decision was a Pass.
- You get a BONUS of 1.5 cents. Note that you can pick UPPER CUTOFF=LOWER
CUTOFF and never Pass.
1. Pick your LOWER CUTOFF - the secret number below which you
of all 3 numbers is Negative
2. Pick your UPPER CUTOFF - the secret number above which you
of all 3 numbers is Positive
3. Optional Questionnaire for extra bonus! We will award a bonus of 1
on how precisely you formulate your statements. For example,
would guess the sum
would guess the sum
to 6 cents depending
(a) What decision rule or heuristic did you use in your guess?
(b) How strong have you weighed your secret number compared to the decision of your
neighbor?
(c) Are there any comments or ideas you would like to share about playing this game?
manal I Account Settings I Sign Out I Help
imer: 00:00:00 of 10 minutes Want to work on this HIT? Total Earned: $1.29
Total HITs Submitted: 71
manastr.ff Reward: $0.0i1per MIT HITs Avoilable.- i Duration: 10 minutes
Qualifcations Required: None
Please read these instructions very carefully to earn up to 8 cents of extra bonusi Feel free to accept other similar HITs, though you will not be allowed to participate more
than once in the same round.
At the beginning of this game, the computer randomly picks 3 secret numbers from all decimal numbers between -10 and 10.
3 players are each assigned one of the secret numbers, and try to guess (one after the other) whether the sum of the 3 numbers is Positive or Negative.
* Unless you aem the first player, you can see the guess of the player who played right before you.
Instead of letting you see the secret number assigned to you, we ask for your strategy (given the guess of the previous player).O We ask for your LOWER CUTOFF - the secret number below which you would guess the sum of all 8 numbers is Negative.O We ask for your UPPER CUTOFF - the secret number above which you would guess the sum of all 8 numbers is Positive.
LOER UPPER
-10 CUTOFF CUTOFF 10 Your "sCt
Dedde Sum Pass Dddi$ os
Negae Podiv
* If the sec-et number assigned to you is below your LOWER CUTOFF, the next player will be told that you guessed that the sum of the numbers is Negative.O You get a BONUS of 2.5 cents if the sum is ideed negative, nothing if the sum is positive.
* If the secret number assigned to you was above your UPPER CUTOFF, the next player wiN be told that you guessed the sum of the numbers is Positive.O You get a BONUS of 2.5 cnts if the sum is indeed positive, nothing if the sum is negative.
If the secret number is between your LOWER CUTOFF and UPPER CUTOFF, the next player will be told your decision was a Pass.
O You get a BONUS of LS cens. Note that you can pick UPPER CUTOFF-LOWER CUTOFF and never Pass.
You are the SECOND player to make a guess.
Player I guessed Negative (i.e. that the sum of the eight numbers is less than nro).
Pick your LOWER CUTOFF - the secret number below which you would guess the sum of all 8 numbers is Negative.
Pick your UPPER CUTOFF - the secret number above which you would guess the sum of all 8 numbers is Positive.
Optional Questionnaire for extra bonusl
We will award a bonus of I to 6 cents depending on how precisely you formulate your statements. For example,
1. What decision rule or heuristic did you use in your guess?
2. How strong have you weighed your secret number compared to the decision of your neighbor?
3. Are there any comments or ideas you would like to share about playing this game?
Provide information/comments on how you made your decision for a bonus up to 6 cents.
Want to work on this HIT
Figure B-1: MTurk Screenshot: the HIT(human intelligence task) used in the Ternary Action
Group.
amazonmechanical turk
Timer 00 00 09 or 10 mnUtes Finished with this HIT? Let someone else do it? Total Earnedt $1.24
I 1'%Total Hits Submitted: 69
U Automatically accept the next HIT
Please read these instructions very carefully to earn up to 8 cents of extra bonusl Feel free to accept other HITs, though you will not be allowed to participate more than oncein the same round.
At the beginning of this game, the computer randomly picks a secret numbers from all decimal numbers between -10 and 10.
3 players are each assigned one of the secret numbers, and try to guess (one after the other) whether the sum of all 3 numbers is Positive or Negative.
9 Unless you are the first player, you can see the guess of the player who played right before you.
* You can only choose between Positive Sum(i.e. sum of all 3 numbers is positive) or Negative Sum(i.e. sum of all 3 numbers is negative). There is no Passing.
* Instead of showing you your secret number and asking you to choose between Positive Sum or Negative Sum directly, we would like to know your strategy (given theprevious player's guess). We ask you for your decision threshold or cutoff- It is the lowest secret number for which you will guess Positive Sum. (Equivalently, it is thehighest secret number for which you will guess Negative Sum.)
* For example, suppose you are the fifth player to play and the previous player guessed Positive Sum. What is the lowest secret number for which you will still guessPositive Sum? (The same question could be asked as follows, what is the hightest secret number for which you will instead guess Negative Sum?)
your
decision
10 cutoff 10 Your secret
number
Guess Guess
Negative Sum Posiive Sum
* If the secret number assigned to you was above your decision cutofi the next player will be told that you guessed Positive Sum.O You get a BONUS of 2.5 cents if the sum is indeed positive, nothing if the sum is negative.
* if the secret number assigned to you is below your decision cutoff, the next player will be told that you guessed Negative Sum.O You get a BONUS of 2.5 cents if the sum is indeed negative, nothing if the sum is positive.
You are the SECOND player to make a guess.
Player i guessed Negative Sum (.e. that the sum of the eight numbers is less than zero).
Pick your dedsion cutoff - the lowest secret number for which you will guess Positive Sum.
Optional Questionnaire for extra bonus!
We will award a bonus of I to 6 cents depending on how precisely you formulate your statements. For example,
i. What decision rule or heuristic did you use in your guess?
2. How strong have you weighed your secret number compared to the decision of your neighbor?
3. Are there any comments or ideas you would like to share about playing this game?
Provide information/comments on how you made your decision for a bonus up to 6 cents.
Finished with this HIT? Let someone else do it?
EAutomaticalv acceot the next HIT
Figure B-2: MTurk Screenshot: the HIT(human intelligence task) used in the Binary Action
Group.
Appendix C
Pilot In-Class Experiment
Introduction1 The following is an experiment in the dynamics of information propagation
and decision making. You will participate in 10 independent and identical decision problems,
or rounds. The class will be broken into 2 groups. You will be rewarded with one homework
point for your participation. In addition, 5, 4 and 3 homework points will be awarded to the
top three performers in each group, as measured by the total score on all rounds.
In this experiment, you will be asked to guess which of two known probability distributions
generated the data, and record your guess on your Decision Grid (See Table C.1).
In each round, each participant will make one decision. Participants will make their decision
one after the other, in a line, or tandem, structure. At first, your position in the line will be
based on the alphabetical order of your last name in the group. After all participants have made
a decision in the first round, you will be assigned a new position in the second round based on
your position in the initial (alphabetical) order. For example, assuming there are 3 people in
your group, the position number in the first round is assigned alphabetically, i.e. Ben Bitdiddle,
Alicia Hacker and Louis Reasoner line up in that order, "1 2 3". Next, you may be given "2 1
3" (on the board), which will determine the new line order for the second round (i.e. Ben and
Alicia swap).
Decision Problem We will begin each round by privately tossing a coin. If the coin flip is
Heads, we will draw from a N(0, 100) distribution. If it is Tails, we will draw from a Ni(10, 100)
distribution. Therefore it is equally likely that either hypothesis is true.
1was conducted as part of an MIT in-class exercise with advanced EECS students who have fluency in
probabilistic concepts. Please see Remark 1 from Section 7 for more information.
Once the distribution is picked, we will come around to each of you and deliver a folded
paper slip with a number drawn from the distribution picked above. The result of this draw
will be your private signal and should not be shared with other participants. Do not unfold the
paper at first. Private signals are independent of each other, and of the numbers used on any
other round.
In each round, you will be asked to choose one of 3 actions: L(low), H(high) or Pass. Action
Pass will always yield +3(think of it as an I-don't-know, or I'm-not-sure statement). Action L
will yield +5 if the distribution used to generate the private information has mean 0 (i.e. if the
coin was heads), otherwise it will yield 0. Action H yields +5 if distribution used to generate
the private information has mean 10 (i.e. if the coin was tails), otherwise it will yield 0 (refer
to Table C-2b).
Unless you are the first participant to make a decision, you will get to observe the decision of
the person right before you in the line. For example, if you are the 3rd participant, you will be
told the action of the 2nd participant before having to make your own decision. After observing
your predecessor's action and before being told your private signal, you will make your decision
as follows:
Instead of choosing L, H or Pass directly, you will have to state the two thresholds 2 for which
you will choose each action, and write them down on your Decision Grid.
For example, suppose you are the 3rd participant. The 2nd participant just passed you his
decision, a L. Next you will have to state two threshold numbers tL and tH for your private
signal xi, for which you will choose L, H or Pass. For example, you may decide you will pick
L if the private signal x <= 3, Pass if 3 < xi <= 8, and H if xi > 8. You may want to adjust
your thresholds as your position changes in the tandem.
After all participants have made a decision, participants are informed what the distribution
that generated the private signals was in their group. If the distribution used to generate the
data was Ni(0, 100), then everyone who chose L wins +5, those who picked Pass win +3, and
those who decided H get nothing.
Rules We ask that you not talk to anyone during the experiment. This experiment is aimed
to test the propagation of information in tandem, and as such, the tandem structure needs to
be strictly enforced.
2potentially between - infinity and infinity
Recap At the beginning of each round, you are asked to stand in line according to last name
alphabetical order. Next, you are given a folded sheet of paper with your private signal on it.
Please keep this closed at first. The person at the end of the line first decides what thresholds
she will use to make her decision, then writes them down on her Decision Grid. She then looks
at her private number, and writes down what action(L,H or Pass) her chosen thresholds result
in on a new paper slip. She finally passes off her decision(L, H or Pass) to the person behind her.
The former repeats the process, first writing down the thresholds, then looking at his private
signal, then writing down what action his thresholds generated, and finally communicating this
action to the third person in line.
This game will be repeated until all 10 rounds are completed. Your final score will be the
sum of the payoffs (+5, +3 or +0) on all 10 rounds, as calculated from your Decision Grid.
Figure C-1: Summary of Instructions
Decision Grid Name:
Round Position Neighbor Your Decision Your Private Your
Decision Thresholds Signal Decision
Example 1 3 H 2 and 12 -1 L
Example 2 8 P -8 and 5 13 H
1 (Alphabetical)
2 (See board)
3 (See board)
4 (See board)
5 (See board)
6 (See board)
7 (See board)
8 (See board)
9 (See board)
10 (See board)
Table C.1: Decision Grid
Notes.
" Decision: either H ("high" if you guess NA(1O, 100) is used), L ("low" if you guess
AN(O, 100) is used) or Pass (if you would rather not guess).
" Position: First (Position 1) is for the person at the beginning of the line.
" Neighbor Decision: H(high), L(low) or Pass.
" Private Signal Thresholds: 2 numbers that fully specify your strategy. You pick L if
your private signal falls below the first threshold, and pick H if it falls above the second
threshold number. You pick Pass if private signal falls between the two threshold numbers.
. Private Signal: Record the number you obtain in the folded paper.
* Your Decision: Directly flows from
allowed to modify your thresholds.
0.04 -
0.03 -. (0,100) - 1(10100
< 0.02 ........... .....
0.0 1 - -- - -- . -.-. -
S0 25-20 -1510 -6 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
(a) At the beginning of every round, we flip a
fair coin. If we get "heads", we generate pri-
vate signals from distribution N(0,100). If we get
"tails", we generate private signals from distribu-
tion N1(10,100).
thresholds and Seeing Private Signals. You are not
(b) Payoff Table: +5 if your guess is wrong, +3 if
Pass, 0 if wrong.
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